1. Our assent ought to be regulated by the grounds of probability.
The grounds of probability we have laid down
in the foregoing chapter: as they are the foundations on which our assent is built, so are they also the measure
whereby its several degrees are, or ought to be regulated: only we are to take notice that, whatever grounds of
probability there may be, they yet operate no further on the mind which searches after truth, and endeavours to
judge right, than they appear; at least, in the first judgment or search that the mind makes. I confess, in the
opinions men have, and firmly stick to in the world, their assent is not always from an actual view of the reasons
that at first prevailed with them: it being in many cases almost impossible, and in most, very hard, even for those
who have very admirable memories, to retain all the proofs which, upon a due examination, made them embrace
that side of the question. It suffices that they have once with care and fairness sifted the matter as far as they
could; and that they have searched into all the particulars, that they could imagine to give any light to the
question; and, with the best of their skill, cast up the account upon the whole evidence: and thus, having once
found on which side the probability appeared to them, after as full and exact an inquiry as they can make, they lay
up the conclusion in their memories as a truth they have discovered; and for the future they remain satisfied with
the testimony of their memories that this is the opinion that, by the proofs they have once seen of it, deserves such
a degree of their assent as they afford it.
