SECT. VSome farther reflections concerning the natural virtues
It has been observ'd, in treating of the passions, that pride and humility, love and hatred, are excited by any advantages or
disadvantages of the mind, body, or fortune; and that these advantages or disadvantages have that effect by producing a
separate impression of pain or pleasure. The pain or pleasure, which arises from the general survey or view of any action or
quality of the mind, constitutes its vice or virtue, and gives rise to our approbation or blame, which is nothing but a fainter
and more imperceptible love or hatred. We have assign'd four different sources of this pain and pleasure; and in order to
justify more fully that hypothesis, it may here be proper to observe, that the advantages or disadvantages of the body and of
fortune, produce a pain or pleasure from the very same principles. The tendency of any object to be useful to the person
possess d of it, or to others; to convey pleasure to him or to others; all these circumstances convey an immediate pleasure to
the person, who considers the object, and command his love and approbation.
To begin with the advantages of the body; we may observe a phaenomenon, which might appear somewhat trivial and
ludicrous, if any thing cou'd be trivial, which fortified a conclusion of such importance, or ludicrous, which was employ'd in
a philosophical reasoning. Tis a general remark, that those we call good women's men, who have either signaliz'd themselves
by their amorous exploits, or whose make of body promises any extraordinary vigour of that kind, are well received by the
fair sex, and naturally engage the affections even of those, whose virtue prevents any design of ever giving employment to
those talents. Here tis evident, that the ability of such a person to give enjoyment, is the real source of that love and esteem
he meets with among the females; at the same time that the women, who love and esteem him, have no prospect of receiving
that enjoyment themselves, and can only be affected by means of their sympathy with one, that has a commerce of love with
him. This instance is singular, and merits our attention.
Another source of the pleasure we receive from considering bodily advantages, is their utility to the person himself, who is
possess'd of them. Tis certain, that a considerable part of the beauty of men, as well as of other animals, consists in such a
conformation of members, as we find by experience to be attended with strength and agility, and to capacitate the creature
for any action or exercise. Broad shoulders, a lank belly, firm joints, taper legs; all these are beautiful in our species. because
they are signs of force and vigour, which being advantages we naturally sympathize with, they convey to the beholder a
share of that satisfaction they produce in the possessor.
So far as to the utility, which may attend any quality of the body. As to the immediate pleasure, `tis certain, that an air of
health, as well as of strength and agility, makes a considerable part of beauty; and that a sickly air in another is always
disagreeable, upon account of that idea of pain and uneasiness, which it conveys to us. On the other hand, we are pleas'd
with the regularity of our own features, tho' it be neither useful to ourselves nor others; and `tis necessary at a distance, to
make it convey to us any satisfaction. We commonly consider ourselves as we appear in the eyes of others, and sympathize
with the advantageous sentiments they entertain with regard to us.
How far the advantages of fortune produce esteem and approbation from the same principles, we may satisfy ourselves by
reflecting on our precedent reasoning on that subject. We have observ'd, that our approbation of those, who are possess d of
the advantages of fortune, may be ascrib'd to three different causes. First, To that immediate pleasure, which a rich man
gives us, by the view of the beautiful cloaths, equipage, gardens, or houses, which he possesses. Secondly, To the
advantage, which we hope to reap from him by his generosity and liberality. Thirdly, To the pleasure and advantage, which
he himself reaps from his possessions, and which produce an agreeable sympathy in us. Whether we ascribe our esteem of
the rich and great to one or all of these causes, we may clearly see the traces of those principles, which give rise to the sense
of vice and virtue. I believe most people, at first sight, will be inclin'd to ascribe our esteem of the rich to self-interest, and
the prospect of advantage. But as `tis certain, that our esteem or deference extends beyond any prospect of advantage to
ourselves, `tis evident, that that sentiment must proceed from a sympathy with those, who are dependent on the person we
esteem and respect, and who have an immediate connexion with him. We consider him as a person capable of contributing to
the happiness or enjoyment of his fellow-creatures, whose sentiments, with regard to him, we naturally embrace. And this
consideration will serve to justify my hypothesis in preferring the third principle to the other two, and ascribing our esteem
of the rich to a sympathy with the pleasure and advantage, which they themselves receive from their possessions. For as even
the other two principles cannot operate to a due extent, or account for all the phaenomena, without having recourse to a
sympathy of one kind or other; `tis much more natural to chuse that sympathy, which is immediate and direct, than that
which is remote and indirect. To which we may add, that where the riches or power are very great, and render the person
considerable and important in the world, the esteem attending them, may, in part, be ascrib'd to another source, distinct from
these three, viz. their interesting the mind by a prospect of the multitude, and importance of their consequences: Tho', in
order to account for the operation of this principle, we must also have recourse to sympathy; as we have observ'd in the
preceding section.
It may not be amiss, on this occasion, to remark the flexibility of our sentiments, and the several changes they so readily
receive from the objects, with which they are conjoin'd. All the sentiments of approbation, which attend any particular
species of objects, have a great resemblance to each other, tho' deriv'd from different sources; and, on the other hand, those
sentiments, when directed to different objects, are different to the feeling, tho' deriv'd from the same source. Thus the beauty
of all visible objects causes a pleasure pretty much the same, tho' it be sometimes deriv'd from the mere species and
appearance of the objects; sometimes from sympathy, and an idea of their utility. In like manner, whenever we survey the
actions and characters of men, without any particular interest in them, the pleasure, or pain, which arises from the survey
(with some minute differences) is, in the main, of the same kind, tho' perhaps there be a great diversity in the causes, from
which it is deriv'd. On the other hand, a convenient house, and a virtuous character, cause not the same feeling of
approbation; even tho' the source of our approbation be the same, and flow from sympathy and an idea of their utility. There
is something very inexplicable in this variation of our feelings; but `tis what we have experience of with regard to all our
passions and sentiments.