SECT. III Of goodness and benevolence
Having thus explain'd the origin of that praise and approbation, which attends every thing we call great in human affections;
we now proceed to give an account of their goodness, and shew whence its merit is deriv'd.
When experience has once given us a competent know. ledge of human affairs, and has taught us the proportion they bear to
human passion, we perceive, that the generosity of men is very limited, and that it seldom extends beyond their friends and
family, or, at most, beyond their native country. Being thus acquainted with the nature of man, we expect not any
impossibilities from him; but confine our view to that narrow circle, in which any person moves, in order to form a judgment
of his moral character. When the natural tendency of his passions leads him to be serviceable and useful within his sphere,
we approve of his character, and love his person, by a sympathy with the sentiments of those, who have a more particular
connexion with him. We are quickly oblig'd to forget our own interest in our judgments of this kind, by reason of the
perpetual contradictions, we meet with in society and conversation, from persons that are not plac'd in the same situation,
and have not the same interest with ourselves. The only point of view, in which our sentiments concur with those of others,
is, when we consider the tendency of any passion to the advantage or harm of those, who have any immediate connexion or
intercourse with the person possess'd of it. And tho' this advantage or harm be often very remote from ourselves, yet
sometimes `tis very near us, and interests us strongly by sympathy. This concern we readily extend to other cases, that are
resembling; and when these are very remote, our sympathy is proportionably weaker, and our praise or blame fainter and
more doubtful. The case is here the same as in our judgments concerning external bodies. All objects seem to diminish by
their distance: But tho' the appearance of objects to our senses be the original standard, by which we judge of them, yet we
do not say, that they actually diminish by the distance; but correcting the appearance by reflection, arrive at a more constant
and established judgment concerning them. In like manner, tho' sympathy be much fainter than our concern for ourselves,
and a sympathy with persons remote from us much fainter than that with persons near and contiguous; yet we neglect all
these differences in our calm judgments concerning the characters of men. Besides, that we ourselves often change our
situation in this particular, we every day meet with persons, who are in a different situation from ourselves, and who cou'd
never converse with us on any reasonable terms, were we to remain constantly in that situation and point of view, which is
peculiar to us. The intercourse of sentiments, therefore, in society and conversation, makes us form some general inalterable
standard, by which we may approve or disapprove of characters and manners. And tho' the heart does not always take part
with those general notions, or regulate its love and hatred by them, yet are they sufficient for discourse, and serve all our
purposes m company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schools.
From these principles we may easily account for that merit, which is commonly ascrib'd to generosity, humanity,
compassion, gratitude, friendship, fidelity, zeal, disinterestedness, liberality, and all those other qualities, which form the
character of good and benevolent. A propensity to the tender passions makes a man agreeable and useful in all the parts of
life; and gives a just direction to all his other quailties, which otherwise may become prejudicial to society. Courage and
ambition, when not regulated by benevolence, are fit only to make a tyrant and public robber. Tis the same case with
judgment and capacity, and all the qualities of that kind. They are indifferent in themselves to the interests of society, and
have a tendency to the good or ill of mankind, according as they are directed by these other passions.
As Love is immediately agreeable to the person, who is actuated by it, and hatred immediately disagreeable; this may also be
a considerable reason, why we praise all the passions that partake of the former, and blame all those that have any
considerable share of the latter. Tis certain we are infinitely touch'd with a tender sentiment, as well as with a great one. The
tears naturally start in our eyes at the conception of it; nor can we forbear giving a loose to the same tenderness towards the
person who exerts it. All this seems to me a proof, that our approbation has, in those cases, an origin different from the
prospect of utility and advantage, either to ourselves or others. To which we may add, that men naturally, without reflection,
approve of that character, which is most like their own. The man of a mild disposition and tender affections, in forming a
notion of the most perfect virtue, mixes in it more of benevolence and humanity, than the man of courage and enterprize,
who naturally looks upon a certain elevation of mind as the most accomplish'd character. This must evidently proceed from
an immediate sympathy, which men have with characters similar to their own. They enter with more warmth into such
sentiments, and feel more sensibly the pleasure, which arises from them.
`Tis remarkable, that nothing touches a man of humanity more than any instance of extraordinary delicacy in love or
friendship, where a person is attentive to the smallest concerns of his friend, and is willing to sacrifice to them the most
considerable interest of his own. Such delicacies have little influence on society; because they make us regard the greatest
trifles: But they are the more engaging, the more minute the concern is, and are a proof of the highest merit in any one, who
is capable of them. The passions are so contagious, that they pass with the greatest facility from one person to another, and
produce correspondent movements in all human breasts. Where friendship appears in very signal instances, my heart catches
the same passion, and is warm'd by those warm sentiments, that display themselves before me. Such agreeable movements
must give me an affection to every one that excites them. This is the case with every thing that is agreeable in any person.
The transition from pleasure to love is easy: But the transition must here be still more easy; since the agreeable sentiment,
which is excited by sympathy, is love itself; and there is nothing requir'd but to change the object.
Hence the peculiar merit of benevolence in all its shapes and appearances. Hence even its weaknesses are virtuous and
amiable; and a person, whose grief upon the loss of a friend were excessive, wou'd be esteem'd upon that account. His
tenderness bestows a merit, as it does a pleasure, on his melancholy.
We are not, however, to imagine, that all the angry passions are vicious, tho' they are disagreeable. There is a certain
indulgence due to human nature in this respect. Anger and hatred are passions inherent in Our very frame and constitutions.
The want of them, on some occasions, may even be a proof of weakness and imbecillity. And where they appear only in a
low degree, we not only excuse them because they are natural; but even bestow our applauses on them, because they are
inferior to what appears in the greatest part of mankind.
Where these angry passions rise up to cruelty, they form the most detested of all vices. All the pity and concern which we
have for the miserable sufferers by this vice, turns against the person guilty of it, and produces a stronger hatred than we are
sensible of on any other occasion. Even when the vice of inhumanity rises not to this extreme degree, our sentiments
concerning it are very much influenc'd by reflections on the harm that results from it. And we may observe in general, that if
we can find any quality in a person, which renders him incommodious to those, who live and converse with him, we always
allow it to be a fault or blemish, without any farther examination. On the other hand, when we enumerate the good qualities
of any person. we always mention those parts of his character, which render him a safe companion, an easy friend, a gentle
master, an agreeable husband, or an indulgent father. We consider him with all his relations in society; and love or hate him,
according as he affects those, who have any immediate intercourse with him. And `tis a most certain rule, that if there be no
relation of life, in which I cou'd not wish to stand to a particular person, his character must so far be allow'd to be perfect. If
he be as little wanting to himself as to others, his character is entirely perfect. This is the ultimate test of merit and virtue.