University of Virginia Library

THE TRENCHES OF PETERSBURG.

On the 21st, Grant extended his line of investment somewhat
more to his left, gaining no material advantage and losing to Lee
three thousand men in the operation. His cavalry were at the
same time dispatched against the railroad communications of
Petersburg to the south and west, and succeeded in doing some

slight damage, when they were encountered by the Confederate
cavalry at Stoney Creek and completely overwhelmed. A remnant
escaped into the Federal lines before Petersburg, having lost
their entire artillery and train, and a thousand prisoners.

And now occurred an episode in the siege that attracted no
general attention at the time, but was a bitter experience to
Hagood's brigade which bore the consequences of its miscarriage.
The very inception of its execution was so completely a failure
that the design of the Confederate general appeared not to be
suspected by either army, or by the public, and stillborn, its
memory will only survive in the limbo of such memoirs as these,
where individual history is the topic.

Grant's line had by this time extended a considerable distance
from the river, and his communication with his base at City
Point was behind his right flank and along the river. General
Lee, in conjunction with General Beauregard, determined to
assume the offensive, drive in Grant's right wing, seize his line of
retreat, and, forcing him away from his base, inflict such a blow
as would raise the siege if not put an end to the campaign. The
plan was entirely feasible. The morale of the Confederate Army
was at its highest, that of the enemy at probably its lowest during
the campaign, and the great disparity of losses induced by Grant's
sledge hammer style of fighting had brought the two armies at
this time to no insurmountable inequality of numbers, other conditions
being favorable. Accordingly, a powerful battery of
forty-four (44) field pieces was on the night of the 23rd June
secretly got into position on the north bank of the Appomattox,
here quite narrow, to enfilade the enemy's line, and Fields's
division of Longstreet's corps with other troops were massed
behind Hagood's position next the river to follow up the attack
which the latter was to lead. Anderson's brigade headed Fields's
column, and Benning's brigade (under Colonel DuBose) was
next. The following official papers narrate the manner in which
the design was attempted to be executed:

"Captain: I am required to make a full report of the operations of my
brigade in front of Petersburg on the morning of the 24th inst. My

brigade occupied the left of our line of entrenchments, resting on the
south bank of the Appomattox—the Twenty-seventh, Twenty-first and
Eleventh regiments filling the space from the river to the City Point Road,
and the Twenty-fifth and Seventh battalion extending along the lines
south of the road. The enemy's entrenchments were at this point parallel
to ours at a distance of near 400 yards, an open field with a rank growth
of oats upon it intervening. Each side had slight rifle pits a short distance
in advance of its entrenchments. Our line of entrenchment was
single, the enemy appeared to be entrenched in their lines close together,
and the attack developed the fact that in their first line they had four and
a half regiments, numbering some 1,600 or 1,700 men.

"My division commander, Major-General Hoke, had instructed me the
night before to be ready for movement in the morning, without indicating
what it would be. About dawn on the 24th he in person informed me that
a general engagement was contemplated that day, and instructed me in
detail as to the part my brigade was to take in bringing it on. A heavy
cannonade was to be opened from the north side of the river upon the
enemy's position, and five minutes after it had ceased I was to charge
that portion of their line between the river and the City Point Road with
the Twenty-seventh, Twenty-first and Eleventh regiments. He informed
me that I was to be closely supported by Anderson's brigade. When we
had succeeded in driving them from their first line, Anderson was to
occupy it till his supports arrived, when he was to press on against their
second and third lines, while pivoting my three regiments on their right
and bringing up the other two regiments of the brigade, I was to form
along the City Point Road perpendicular to my first position. Then, taking
the enemy's first line as a directrix, I was to clear Colquitt's front as far
as and including Hare's Hill, etc., etc.

"While General Hoke was still explaining the plan of battle to me,
Lieutenant Andrews reported to me from General Anderson, stating that
the latter was in position and had sent him to keep in communication with
me. In consultation with General Hoke, my plan of attack was settled
and every preparation made.

"The artillery opened precisely at 7 a. m. and ceased precisely at 7:30.
At 7:20 a. m. I sent Lieutenant Andrews to General Anderson to say I
would move in fifteen minutes. He left me with speed. A delay of seven
minutes, however, occurred in my movement, and at precisely 7:42 I
advanced. I am so far thus accurate as to time, because I did not see
my support, did not know their precise distance in rear, and being governed
in my instructions by time, noticed the watch closely.

"My advance was made with 400 picked men and officers as skirmishers,
followed by the balance of the three regiments (about 550 men) in a
second deployed line at close supporting distance. Lieutenant-Colonel Nelson,
Seventh battalion, was selected to command the skirmishers. I took
direction of the second line.

"The attack was made. The enemy were driven from their rifle pits
without resistance of moment; their first line was gained and a portion of

it captured; some thirty prisoners were taken here and sent to the rear;
and the enemy's whole line was seriously shaken, his men in numbers running
from the works. Discovering our small force, and the attack not being
followed up, his first line rallied, re-enforcements were rapidly pushed up
from his rear, and we were compelled to fall back. This was done slowly,
and the enemy, endeavoring to charge us, was driven back. My men,
under orders, laid down in the oats about half-way between the two hostile
entrenchments to await Anderson's advance and then go with him. Numbers
of them, however, got back as far as our rifle pits and were permitted
to remain there with the same orders as the more advanced line. None of
them came back to our entrenchment except a few skulkers, whom every
attack develops, and in this case, I am happy to say, they were very few.

"How much time was occupied in these movements I am unable to say,
as I did not look at my watch again. When the vigor of my attack was
broken and my men had begun to fall back, the left of Benning's brigade,
moving by a flank and coming from across the City Point Road, reached
the right of the entrenchments I had left in advancing, and there stopped.
A discussion between Major-Generals Hoke and Fields ensued, and, after
some delay, this brigade moved in and was ready to advance.

"The report of Colonel DuBose, commanding Benning's brigade, will
show the time of his arrival and the then condition of affairs. General
Anderson's report will explain the delay in his arrival. Major-General
Hoke was on the ground during the whole morning, and can speak of his
personal knowledge.

"The order of attack being countermanded, I kept out all day as many
of my men as my rifle pits would hold, withdrawing the rest by squads.
At night all were withdrawn and the regiments re-organized. My loss was
about a third of the force engaged, 25 being killed, 73 wounded and 208
missing, making an aggregate of 306.

"The gallant Lieutenant-Colonel Nelson is missing; it is hoped not killed.
Captain Axson, Twenty-seventh regiment, was killed at the head of his
company. Lieutenants Huguenin and Trim, of the Twenty-seventh, Lieutenants
Chappell, Ford and Vandiford, of the Twenty-first, and Lieutenant
Smith, of the Eleventh, were wounded.

"Captains Mulraney and Buist, of the Twenty-seventh, were captured on
the enemy's works (the latter after receiving two wounds).[25]

"Captain Raysor and Lieutenant Riley, of the Eleventh regiment, Lieutenant
White, of the Twenty-seventh, and Lieutenant Clemants, of the
Twenty-first, are missing.

"Captain: In obedience to orders from department headquarters (Beauregard's),
I respectfully report that a plan of attack upon the enemy was
settled upon on 23d June, 1864, to take place on the following morning,
which plan is fully known to the commanding general. On the night of
the 23d General Hagood was made familiar with the mode of attack
sufficiently to make the necessary arrangements. No other officer of my
command was aware of the intended advance. This precaution was taken,
fearing that by some means the enemy might learn our intentions and prepare
for us.

"In accordance with the plan, my arrangements were made which are
fully and properly given in the enclosed report of Brigadier-General
Hagood. Dividing my forces on the left of the City Point Road into two
heavy skirmish lines, one to be supported by the other, and the whole to
be supported by Brigadier-General Anderson's brigade of Fields's division,
formed in line of battle behind the hill in rear of the entrenchments then
occupied by Hagood's left. As was directed, the artillery from the batteries
on the north side of the river opened fire upon the entrenchments of
the enemy as soon as the morning mists had cleared away, and continued
its fire with great accuracy but no execution for half an hour. After the
lapse of five minutes the fire of these guns was directed upon the batteries
of the enemy, drawing in a great degree their fire from the advancing
infantry which, as far as I could see, was the only service rendered by our
guns. Indeed, I fear we were injured more than we gained by the use of
our guns, as it notified the enemy of our intended attack. My intention
was to attack immediately after our guns opened upon the enemy's batteries,
but as General Anderson had not reported, I delayed, and immediately
one of his staff officers appeared by whom General Anderson was
informed that in fifteen minutes the advance would certainly take place,
which would give him time to reach the entrenchments then occupied by
General Hagood. At the appointed time the advance was ordered, and
immediately the second line followed. The first line gallantly entered the
entrenchments of the enemy and did their duty nobly, and (as was witnessed
by General Lee himself) succeeded not only in breaking the enemy,
but drove them from their works.

"It was never expected that the entrenchments of the enemy could be
held by these two lines of skirmishers, but that they should occupy them
till the line of battle could reach them. I asked Major-General Fields, who
was on the ground, to order Anderson forward, as a moment's delay would
be fatal. He immediately sent the order, which had been previously sent,
to General Anderson to go forward. It is proper here for me to state that
this was my third effort to get General Anderson forward after my first
notice to him that `in fifteen minutes I would certainly move forward.'
Some time after General Fields's second order was sent to General Anderson,
he received a note from him saying that the entrenchments were still
occupied by General Hagood's troops. In this he was greatly mistaken, as
will be seen by General Hagood's report, and, if necessary to prove this

mistake, Colonel DuBose, commanding Benning's brigade, will corroborate
the fact that the entrenchments were then free of troops, except some
stragglers, of whom I am sure no command is exempt. Colonel DuBose
had by this time moved up in line of battle on the right of General Anderson's
position, and, after reaching the trenches, moved by a left flank down
them and occupied the position which Anderson was to have taken.

"After some time, I suppose an hour, General Fields put another brigade[26]
in the trenches on the left of the City Point Road, with a view to attack,
and seemed anxious to do so, but I advised against it, as the enemy had had
time and had made all preparation for us, and I felt assured he would
sustain a heavy loss and accomplish nothing. At this time orders were
received from General Lee for me to report to him in company with General
Fields, and, on hearing the position of affairs, he directed the attack
abandoned.

"I was much troubled at the loss of my men, who did their duty truly
and well, without results which to me appeared certain and surely ought
to have been reaped.

"It is not my desire to place blame or responsibility upon others. I fear
neither. In making the foregoing statements I merely give facts to the
best of my knowledge, and the commanding general can draw his own conclusions.
I have unofficially heard that both I and my command were
censured by the commanding general. My regret is in attempting this
attack without full command of all the forces which were to participate.
Both the plan of battle and of attack were good, but failed in the execution.
The enemy became extremely uneasy along his entire line, when
the attack was made, and, had we been successful at that point, our results
would have been such as have not heretofore been equalled. General
Hagood did everything in his power to give us success, and desired to push
forward when, in my judgment, it appeared hazardous.

"(Endorsement.)

"Respectfully forwarded to General R. E. Lee for his information.

"It will be seen by the reports of Generals Hoke and Hagood that they
are not responsible for the failure of the attack of the 24th ulto., which
would have undoubtedly been successful had the supports advanced in
time. General Hoke is mistaken, if he refers to me, when he says `I have
heard unofficially that both I and my command have been censured by the
commanding general.' I stated only that `the success would have been
most brilliant had the skirmishers been properly supported.' His report
and that of General Hagood prove the correctness of my assertion.

"General Hoke says, on the second page of his report, `After a lapse of
five minutes the fire of the guns (i. e., 44 guns on the north side of the
Appomattox) was directed upon the batteries of the enemy, drawing in a
great degree their fire from the advancing infantry, which, as far as I
could see, was the only service rendered by our guns. Indeed, I fear we
were injured more than we gained by the use of our guns, as it notified
the enemy of our intended attack.'

"The object of opening the fire of the batteries referred to during the
half hour preceding the infantry attack was to demoralize the enemy's
troops occupying the defensive lines which were to be attacked, and which
were enfiladed and taken in reverse by those batteries. It was expected
also that the heavy artillery fire would throw into confusion any supports
the enemy might have concealed in the woods near his line. The
best proof of the entire success of the plan is the facility with which an
unsupported line of skirmishers got possession of those lines, with a loss
of only twenty-five killed and seventy-two wounded. I am decidedly of
opinion that regard being had to locality and the attending circumstances,
no better results could have been obtained than the plan adopted, and
which failed only because not properly supported.

"Headquarters Department North Carolina and Southern Virginia, 5th
July, 1864.

Thus failed a brillant and entirely practical design, which
might have given a different complexion to the history of this
famous siege. General Hoke has noticed a fundamental error in
the plan of attack, the supports not being under the same command
as the attacking line. General Fields was present at the
entrenchments during the whole affair, and no blame appears to
have attached to him. If it was impracticable, as it probably was
under the circumstances, for the attack to have been made and
supported by the same division, a common superior should have
been on the spot to harmonize the action of the two divisions
partly engaged. Generals Lee and Beauregard were near the
batteries across the river in close view of the field, but without
means of direct communication, and therefore unable to take
tactical direction of the affair.

So far, the plan of attack was radically wrong, but there is
another and more palpable cause of failure manifest. Anderson
was in line of battle (the head of a column by brigades) behind
a hill about 150 yards in rear of Hagood when the attack was

to commence, the "delay of seven minutes" which occurred in
Hagood's movement was intentional on his part. He was waiting
to see Anderson's approach advancing over the hill before he
started, and he would have continued to wait, had not an aide
from General Hoke, with whom General Fields was standing
some forty yards off across the road, directed him to move at once.
Instead of moving forward in line over the hill to the support
of the attack, Anderson, when compelled by repeated orders to
move, went, it was said, to the rear by file as far as the Iron
Bridge nearly a quarter of a mile, thence full another quarter of
a mile up the ravine of Poor Creek till he reached the shelter of
the entrenchments near Hare's Hill, and then came stumbling
along them already crowded with men, until he reached the
part Hagood had left. He was more than one hour getting to a
position to which he had little more than 150 yards to march
straight forward, and with nothing in his way but the usual
hazards of hostile fire. In the meantime, DuBose had got up
three-quarters of an hour ahead of the brigade that was to lead
him, but too late to support Hagood's attack, which was made
at a charging step.

General Hagood had no personal interview with Anderson
afterward and never saw his report, if any was made by him, to
explain his conduct. On the record here given, there is but one
comment to be made, and that the obvious one—Anderson should
have been shot.[27] There was not even a court held, though the
common sense of that portion of the army that knew anything of
the affair kept afloat for two or three weeks the daily rumor that
one had been ordered.

This day's experience was a peculiarly trying one to the commander
of Hagood's brigade. His men were uselessly sacrificed;
and from the secrecy with which the designs of the day had been
kept, the delay in the arrival of the supports, and the absence
of action on their part when they had come, there was a meaningless
air thrown over his assault which he was not at liberty
to explain. He was conscious that to some extent his command
was demoralized by the result, and that it appeared to both men
and officers a riddle why a skirmish line unsupported should be

rushed upon a triple line of breastworks garnished with artillery
and manned by five fold their number of infantry. At length a
Charleston editor, from which city it will be remembered two
regiments of the brigade came, gave currency to the absurd idea
that General Hagood had made the attack without orders, and
with ambitious views on his part. Then, with General Beauregard's
approbation, he sent for publication in the same sheet
sufficient extracts from the foregoing official papers to partially
explain his connection with the affair; more he could not do pending
the campaign, and for some time afterward the injurious
reputation of recklessness clung to him in consequence of this
day's work.

A few days previous to this, in consequence of most of the regiments
of the brigade being without field officers, General Hagood
had divided his command into wings and given general superintendence
of each to the two officers present highest in rank.
Lieutenant-Colonel Nelson was put in charge of the regiments
north of the City Point road, and it was thus he happened to be
engaged when his regiment was not. He was standing by
Hagood's side on the right of the line, when Hoke's aide brought
the order to advance. The men, who had been told to follow his
lead, were intently watching him, and when he was ordered to go,
without speaking, he drew his handkerchief from his breast and
raised it aloft. The men sprang over the parapet with a yell
and rushed upon the enemy across the intervening space, he
moving upon the right of the line. When they were driven back
and had laid down in the oats (as they were instructed), to await
the coming of the supports, he moved east along the whole length
of his line under the close fire of the enemy and shortly after
reaching the left, disappeared. The men of his command thought
he was left by them wounded on the field. Painful rumors
reached us through prisoners a few days afterward of his having
been murdered by negro troops while being taken by the enemy
to the rear. General Hagood brought the rumor to General Lee's
attention, naming a captured lieutenant from whom he had it,
and asked that a flag should enquire into the fact. The request
was not granted. Thus fell a devoted patriot, a gallant soldier,
a courteous gentleman.

Captain Axson was a valuable officer. He was mortally

wounded early in the charge and lingered painfully for some
hours, when succor could not be rendered him. Captain Mulraney
was captured literally upon the enemy's works, waving his
cap and cheering on his men. Captain Buist had joined the
brigade for the first time, after Cold Harbor; he was not
wounded, though so stated upon misinformation, was exchanged
shortly afterwards through some special influences and never
again served on the field. He obtained one of the numerous
exempt positions which had begun at this period of the war to
be ominously sought after.

Lieutenant Trim lost his arm and was put on the retired list.
Lieutenants Smith, Vandiford and Chappell died of their
wounds. Chappell was the young officer whose good conduct at
Walthal Junction so materially aided in rallying the Twenty-first
regiment. At Drury's Bluff his coolness and efficiency
attracted the attention of his brigade commander and procured
him a compliment on the field. At first, he seemed likely to
recover from his wound, and had procured an invalid leave.
When pulling on his boot preparatory to leaving the hospital for
home, he ruptured an artery near which the ball had passed, and
bled to death. Some days after he had been wounded, General
Hagood had sent him a handsome pistol captured from a Federal
officer, with a note saying that it was intended as a testimonial
of his uniform gallantry and good conduct. When the surgeon
informed him that the blood could not be staunched, and that he
must die, he called for his pistol and had it laid beside him on
his cot. The pistol which he so treasured with its history was
carefully forwarded to his widowed mother as a memorial of her
noble boy. There was slain, too, upon this field among the noncommissioned
officers, Pickens Butler Watts, first sergeant of
Allston's company, Twenty-seventh regiment, the most distinguished
soldier of his rank at that time in the brigade. He had
been mentioned for conspicuous gallantry upon every field in
which his regiment had been engaged in this campaign, and in
the pursuit of the routed Federal army into its lines at Bermuda
Hundreds, when, weak from sickness, he had fainted upon the
march, he declined to use an ambulance, but recovering, pushed
on and at nightfall was in the ranks of his company, skirmishing
with the enemy.

Eldred Gantt, sergeant-major of the Eleventh regiment, and a
brother of its colonel, was also wounded in this affair, and died a
few days later.[28]

On the morning of the 18th June, when Beauregard retired
from the Harrison Creek line to the one now occupied, the latter
from the banks of the Appomattox to near the Jerusalem Plank
road, where it ran into the line of the original defences, was in
some places a trench not over two feet deep, in other places not
a spade had been put in the ground—the line had been merely
marked out by the engineers. The enemy following up immediately,
this portion of the defences, as previously noticed, was
constructed in the intervals of battle or under the constant fire
of sharpshooters, and consequently remained a siege trench, the
men standing in the ditch from which the earth was taken that
formed the parapet, and the latter having no exterior ditch and
but little elevation in place of which to impede an assaulting
column abattis, chevaux du frize, palisades, breakwater, etc.,
were resorted to. Very little artillery was placed on the line of
the infantry trench. Generally, the mortars and guns used were
placed in suitable positions in rear. There were few if any guns
used by the defence of heavier calibre than a Coehorn mortar or
a field piece. In the progress of the siege, with incessant labor
night and day, the Confederate works were strengthened in profile,
drained, traversed, and covered approaches made. Bombproofs
were very little, if at all, resorted to, and the men had no
shelter from the weather save the few trees accidentally upon the
line, or their blankets hoisted after the fashion of the tent d'abris.

Grant's lines conform to the general direction of the defence at
distances varying from two to four hundred yards, and between
the opposing lines each side had its rifle pits occupied by a picket
line at night which was withdrawn in the day. At the Jerusalem
Plank road, the lines ceased their parallelism, and the Federal
line proceeded southerly towards the Weldon road, where bending
back it eventually rested upon the Blackwater Swamp thus
ensconcing the besieging force in a complete entrenched camp.
Upon the latter portion of their line, collision was only occasional,
and partook of the nature of field fighting. But from the Jerusalem
Plank road back to the Appomattox, the fire of artillery

and sharpshooters was incessant, frequently continuing night and
day, never ceasing from dawn till dark.

The morning of the 19th opened with heavy firing from sharpshooters
which continued all day and ceased at night on Hagood's
front. For this and several days the casualties were numerous
from the imperfect protection as yet secured by the men. There
were two Napoleons on Hagood's line, where it crossed the City
Point road, and on the 21st he caused one of them to be arranged
for vertical fire by depressing the train in a pit 'till the gun had
an angle of 45 degrees elevation, and firing with small charges.
He had seen it done at the siege of Charleston; and here as there
it answered admirably as an expedient.

On the 23rd, eight Coehorns were placed in position in rear of
his left; and subsequently another battery of these was established
behind his right, where it joined Colquitt. The enemy had
mortar batteries in our front by the 27th, but the fire from these
did at no time much damage on this portion of our line. He
found it difficult to drop his shell upon the thin riband of a ditch
running parallel; and falling front or rear of it they did no
harm. When they fell in the ditch, which was seldom, the frequent
traverses limited their destructive effect. The most galling
artillery fire to which the brigade was subjected was from Hare's
Hill, whence its line was partially enfiladed. The enemy now also
erected at some distance in rear of his right a battery of Parrotts
and commenced shelling the town. The portion of it within range
was soon abandoned by the inhabitants, though many of the
poorer class remained, taking refuge in their cellars, when the
bombardment was heavy. What number of casualties occurred
among the citizens is not known to the writer, though he saw a
poor woman killed by a shell in the suburb of Blanford as he was
returning upon one occasion to the trenches from his baggage
wagon whither he had gone to get a change of clothing.

Our picket line on the left of the City Point road was not
advanced as far by many yards as it was on the right of it. The
enemy's conformed somewhat to ours; and on the night of the
27th their officer inspecting his picket and coming from toward
the river, crossed the road in this interval and found himself
behind our picket line on the right, when he was quietly marched
to the rear. The trap was kept open and for two more nights

the enemy must have been mystified by the disappearance of their
inspecting officers. The last night three captains walked into it,
but we got no more.

An incident occurred with one of these captains that is narrated,
because it seemed to be characteristic of the Puritan. When
captured they were sent back to General Hagood's pit on the
main line, and, as they were taken on duty, the general directed
Lieutenant Moffett of his staff to ascertain if they had any official
papers or orders about them. They were genteel-looking men,
close shaved, neatly dressed, and one of them, near middle age,
having the appearance of a substantial God-fearing and prosperous
family man ere he had become "a boy in blue." The lieutenant,
apologizing for the necessity, proceeded to discharge his duty,
and required them to empty their pockets. Gold watches, pocket
compasses and Rogers's cutlery were produced—the elder also
pulling out several hundred dollars in greenbacks. These were
all returned to them, and the lieutenant asked if they had nothing
else about them. "Nothing," said the oldest officer with quite an
air, "except my Bible." "Let me see it," and from its leaves as
it was handed out fell a half dozen card photographs. One was
of an old lady, a good specimen of matronly respectability, and
the mother of the prisoner; the others were of naked women in
lewd postures!

The chronicler of a former rebellion, in which the forefathers
of these people were the rebels, tells of a skirmish of Prince
Rupert's in which a clergyman, a "principal governor," and a
"shining light" among the then party of moral ideas, was slain
after refusing quarter and provoking the soldiers by the most
odious reviling of the person and honor of the king, and "in
whose pockets were found several papers of memorials of his
own obscene and scurrilous behavior with several women in such
loose expression as modest ears cannot endure."[29] The stirpiculturist
will note with delight how "like begets like," and might be
tempted to trace the descent through Burns's "Holy Willie."

After making his own works in our front secure from assault,
Grant at first appeared to have resorted to regular approaches
by zigzags and parallels, but these were discontinued after little
progress had been made; and the impression prevailed on the

Confederate side that he had resorted to mining. Accordingly,
counter mines were commenced at the points where the hostile
lines were nearest. In the construction of these the shafts with
a cross section of 6′ and 4′ generally began to be sunk some thirty
or forty feet behind the infantry trench and descended at an easy
grade until it reached the water-bearing stratum at the particular
point, which was seldom over thirty feet beneath the surface.
Then pushing forward, until some sixty to one hundred feet in
front of the trench had been gained, the gallery was extended
laterally right and left for a greater or less distance to cover the
menaced point. This was the general outline of their construction,
but some were very elaborately executed, ramifying in every
direction. All were ceiled with plank and scantling as the work
advanced and were lighted and ventilated by perpendicular
shafts. Holes were also bored with earth augurs from the galleries
horizontally towards the enemy to serve as acoustic tubes
in conveying the sounds of hostile mining. Sentinels were kept
in the galleries night and day; and their cool, quiet aisles were
delightful retreats from the heat and turmoil of the trenches. It
must be confessed, however, that with the ever present death
above ground there was something in the dank stillness that
reigned within them suggestive of the grave.

About the 28th July, the Federal commander was discovered
transporting troops to the north of the James, and Lee began to
send over troops to meet this threat against Richmond.

On the 29th, Grant suddenly brought back his troops, and at
daylight, on the 30th, sprung a mine under the salient on the
Baxter road held by Elliott's South Carolina brigade. The
breach was immediately assailed and occupied, but the enemy was
unable to get beyond the crater, where he was held at bay until
the arrival of re-enforcements expelled him and our original lines
were re-established. This was perhaps the most prominent event
of the siege, but it is not within the scope of these Memoirs to
go into its details, Hagood's brigade being in no way connected
with it. The fighting on the crater was desperate—the Confederates
sustaining 1,200 casualties and inflicting a loss of over six
thousand upon the enemy, of which 1,100 were prisoners.

The ordinary details for guard and picket and fatigue duty
from the troops were very heavy. All the men were required to

sit in line of battle upon the banquette, arms in hand and officers
at their posts for the half hour preceding and the half hour after
dark. From this time, until an hour before daylight, one-half of
the men not on other duty were kept awake at a time in the same
position, while the other half were allowed to get what sleep they
could in the bottom of the trench, their arms and accoutrements
laid aside but near at hand and disturbed by the frequent
passage of inspecting officers or fatigue parties blundering along
in the dark on their prostrate forms. From an hour before day
until after good daylight all were roused up and stood to arms,
fully equipped and prepared to repel the assault. Again during
the day only one-half were allowed to lay off their equipments at
a time; and none was permitted, day or night, to leave his
assigned place in the trench without special permission. The
company officers remained at all times with their men in the
trench; the field officers and brigade staff had their respective
pits, some six feet in rear of the general trench, and were permitted
to use them except when the men were standing to arms.
Division commanders were from six hundred yards to a half a
mile in rear and generally occupied houses in the suburbs. Generals
Lee and Beauregard had their headquarters near each other
on the hill north of the Appomattox near Pocohontas Bridge,
and with their staffs were in tents. The men in the trenches
served as sharpshooters by regular detail. The constant use of
the shoulder in shooting produces bruises and soreness, so that
they accustomed themselves to rest the rifle on the parapet and
fire it as a pistol. The accuracy of their fire was frequently
spoken of by letter writers to the Northern papers; and our men,
as at Wagner, became very fond of it. It was a relief to the
passive endurance which made up so large a part of their duty.

Such service continued day in and day out, for so long a time,
was trying to the last degree upon the men already jaded by an
active campaign. For some time, during July, not a field officer
was present with the brigade for duty, and four out of the five
regiments were commanded by lieutenants. To preserve anything
like organization and efficiency, General Hagood was compelled
to consolidate companies temporarily, and to assign to duty, as
acting commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers and even
privates. In doing this he selected men who had hitherto been

mentioned for good conduct in battle. This he did without
authority of law, but it was acquiesced in and answered a good
purpose, though it was a dangerous experiment in an army like
ours. The trenches, however, were not a very congenial atmosphere
for demagogy. The most rampant asserter of reserved
rights would, like Esau, have sold his birthright for a mess of
pottage, provided it was cooked done, and an hour's peaceful
sleep had been added to the bargain. By the first of August (in
six weeks from the commencement of this service) the strength
under arms of the brigade was reduced one-half, and in three
weeks more it was reduced two-thirds—numbering then but 700
men. The casualties in battle, excluding the day of the 24th of
June, did not exceed one hundred, though not a day passed without
more or less; and from the fact that the wounds were generally
in the head or the upper part of the person, and from the
enfeebled state of the general health of the men, they were mostly
fatal. Diseases of a low, nervous type carried the men to the
field infirmary; and at one time there were five hundred cases
in Hagood's brigade alone. These field infirmaries were placed in
the woods by some roadside in rear of the city, provided sometimes
with a few tents, never with enough, and sometimes with
none—where the men were sent whom it was thought possible to
restore to duty in a short time and where the surgical operations
were performed. The regimental surgeons were here. The assistant
surgeons were in some places, more or less sheltered, as near
as one could be found to the lines. The litter bearers brought the
wounded to them, and after temporary treatment they were dispatched
in two-horse ambulances to the infirmary. The various
post hospitals in Petersburg, Richmond and even further off,
received the severe cases. These hospitals were generally well
managed; but the field infirmaries were the scene of much suffering,
partly unavoidable and partly due to mismanagement. It
depended entirely upon the fidelity and administrative ability of
the senior brigade surgeon how each was managed. The brigade
commander was expected to exercise a supervision over them
which his duties in the trenches prevented from being sufficiently
rigid; and the higher medical officers were not, within the writer's
observation, particular enough in supervising their brigade subordinates.

From the 1st to the 20th of August nothing occurred with us to
break the monotony of life in the trenches, such as it was. The
foregoing narrative has given the outline of the military events
and surroundings—the naked skeleton of the history; but it is
difficult to convey to one who has never had a similar experience
an idea of the actual reality of the labors and suffering of the
men who for these long, hot summer months held without relief
the trenches of Petersburg. The following extracts from the
journal (MSS.) of Lieutenant Moffett, adjutant of the Twenty-fifth
regiment, then acting as inspector on the brigade staff, and
who gallantly and faithfully discharged his full share of the
duties performed, depicts vividly but without exaggeration the
life we led.

"Seldom," says he, "are men called upon to endure as much
as was required of the troops who occupied the trenches of Petersburg
during the months of June, July and August. It was endurance
without relief; sleeplessness without excitement; inactivity
without rest; constant apprehension requiring ceaseless watching.
The nervous system was continually strained 'till the spirits
became depressed almost beyond endurance. . . . . Day after day,
as soon as the mists which overhung the country gave way to
dawn and until night spread her welcome mantle over the earth,
the sharpshooting was incessant, the constant rattle of small
arms, the spiteful hissing of bullets, never ceased, and was only
drowned by the irregular but daily bombardment from heavier
metal. Casualties were of daily occurrence, and no place along
the line could be considered safe. The most sheltered were penetrated
by glancing bullets, and many severe wounds were received
in this way. The trenches themselves were filthy, and though
policing was rigidly enforced, yet it was almost impossible to
keep down the constant accumulation. Vermin abounded, and
diseases of various kinds showed themselves. The digestive
organs of the men became impaired by the rations issued and the
manner in which they were prepared. Diarrhea and dysentery
were universal; the legs and feet of the men swelled until they
could not wear their shoes; the filth of their persons from the
scarcity of water was terrible; and they presented the appearance
rather of inmates of a miserably conducted poor house than
of soldiers of an army. But all of this was endured; and although

among the meaner class desertions occurred and even self-mutilation
was resorted to[30] to escape this horrid nightmare that brooded
upon spirits not highly enough tempered to endure it, yet the
great majority of the men stood all their sufferings with unflinching
endurance, and never yielded 'till disease drove them to the
field infirmary. Not the least of the evils encountered was the
unavoidable stench from the latrines. Again, when it rained ever
so little, the clay of the soil became a soapy and sticky mud; and
after a heavy rain (before drainage was looked to) I have seen
the water waist deep in the bottom of the trench and eighteen
inches on the banquette, leaving no place for the men to sit or lie
down upon. Fortunately at night the sharpshooting ceased, and
the men spread their blankets on the parapet and slept. . . ."

Such was the life of the soldier in the trenches, and the following
verses appearing anonymously in the Petersburg paper,
during the siege, takes up the story and gives what was its frequent
ending: