University of Virginia Library

It is curious to compare the manner in which this battle was
actually fought with the well-considered plan devised by Beauregard,
and clearly explained beforehand to his subordinates. The
plan of battle was, briefly, to seize the enemy's line of retreat,
demonstrate on his front, and carry his position by a turning
movement on the flank, behind which was his line of communication.

The actual fight was an almost simultaneous direct attack along
his whole front, and with a hand upon the enemy's line of retreat,
Whiting failed to grasp it. Thus the conceptions of genius were
in the execution reduced to the least skilful of performances,
and instead of a decisive defeat, Butler was merely pushed back
upon his fortified base.

Some remarks are necessary upon the details of the battle as
described in the foregoing official reports. The movement of the
"right regiment of Lewis's brigade" and of "the reserve brigade"
to the relief of "our left center" (Hagood's brigade) mentioned
by General Beauregard upon information from Ransom's
division, was a myth. The writer avers most positively that no
part of Ransom's division ever came to Hagood's assistance, or
passed in front of him till the enemy had retired from his front.
General Hoke's report distinctly sustains this averment, and
General Beauregard's report itself shows that the force from
Ransom's division could not have performed this feat, although
it was the duty to which the whole division was assigned. The
report reads: ". . . Colquitt's brigade from the reserve was sent
him (Ransom) at 6:30 a. m. Before it had arrived, he reported
the enemy driving Hoke's left and sent the right regiment of

Lewis's brigade forward at a double quick towards the point of
supposed danger. This held the enemy long enough for the
reserve brigade[16] to arrive, charge, and drive him back from the
front of our left center over and along the works to the turnpike."
Yet, at 7:15, just three-quarters of an hour after Colquitt's
brigade had moved to Ransom, and about the time it would have
completed this clearing of Hagood's front, the report states, "A
slight modification of the original movement was ordered to be
made to relieve Hoke's front, on which the enemy had been
allowed to mass his forces by the inaction of the left." This order
was to Ransom, and, in substance, to resume the offensive. On
receiving it, he "reported a necessity to straighten and reform his
line in the old position, near the lines he had stormed. Here he
rested during the greater part of the day."

General Beauregard's report also credits Johnson's brigade
with a share in the capture of the five pieces of artillery on the
pike. Hoke, commanding both brigades, was present in person
and gives it exclusively to Hagood's brigade.

General Beauregard (adopting Hoke's report), speaks of one
regiment of Hagood's brigade thrown forward to connect with
Ransom's right. This is scarcely accurate, though there was but
one regiment that actually struck the enemy's second line of
breastworks. The circumstances were minutely these:

Shortly after General Ransom's division had engaged the
enemy and while his advance, visible by the flash of his guns
through the fog, was still on a line with Hagood's front, the
brigade skirmishers under Major Rion were ordered forward.
These quickly drove in the enemy's pickets and carried the
enemy's first line (our abandoned trench), except that portion
just on the turnpike, where the artillery was. The Twenty-fifth
regiment had to be brought up to accomplish that. Hagood's
brigade was now in position, without any other regiment beside
the Twenty-fifth having been engaged, behind this outer line;
but as it bent back on the left to run into the intermediate line at
Fort Stephens, the left regiment of the brigade (the Twenty-seventh)
was placed beyond the trench when this curve backward
commenced, in order to have the line straight and ready for a
further forward movement. There continued a desultory exchange

of fire. Hagood was standing near the Twenty-seventh regiment,
holding his horse by the bridle, when Hoke came up to him on
foot and directed him to swing out to the right and form on the
turnpike in order to connect with Ransom. The fog had partially
lifted and a body of troops was in sight in the open, full 800
yards from Hagood, diagonally from his left front and at least
three-quarters of a mile from the turnpike, on which his right
was resting. This body of troops had half pivoted to the right
and halted. It was Ransom's whole force (see Beauregard's
report). Hagood knew that it was Ransom, for, notwithstanding
the fog, he had, as before noted, been able to trace his course by
the flash of his guns as well as by their sound. Now they were
perfectly visible, halted, and not firing, but firing was going on
ahead of them, and nearer, but still not yet in front of Hagood's
left, from a line not visible which proved to have been Ransom's
skirmishers. When Hagood received Hoke's order, he did not
bring the position of these halted troops to the latter's attention,
for he supposed they were only a part of Ransom's division,
perhaps a reserve, while the line firing, and not visible, was
Ransom's main line advancing through the woods to the pike
with but little opposition. Confirmed in this idea by the positive
direction to swing out on the pike, and connect with Ransom, Hagood merely spoke with Hoke of the tactical execution of the
order and proceeded to obey it. He kept the Twenty-fifth and
Twenty-first regiments, which were nearest the pike, in position,
to give a fire down it, and, pivoting on the right company of the
Seventh battalion, moved out the Seventh battalion and the
Eleventh and Twenty-seventh regiments. This was done in line,
and each regiment swung round by the movement technically
known as "change direction," thus advancing in echellon to their
new position. The distance between our outer line now reoccupied
by us and the enemy's line of breastworks, on the edge of
the woods, was not over two hundred yards. And it was in this
space that these three regiments were maneuvering. In the
change of direction their left alone would strike these works
which, it seemed, Hoke thought the enemy had been driven from
by Ransom's flank movement. Hagood left Hoke after receiving
the order and the movement had hardly begun when a terrific
fire broke out upon the advancing troops, but was hottest upon
the Seventh battalion. Hagood galloped in that direction, having
his horse killed under him as he reached the Seventh. This
battalion, having only to wheel on its own ground, had accomplished
or nearly so a change of direction at right angles to its
former position and parallel to the pike, when its commander,
halting it, caused his men to sit down and fire from that position
while they marked the base of the movement. The Eleventh
regiment, advancing firing, was steadily approaching its position
on the new line, and the Twenty-seventh, coming on upon the
extreme left, struck the breastworks on the edge of the woods and
drove the enemy from them at the point of impact, notwithstanding
the rush of its charge was impeded by wire entanglements
just in front of the works. The increased fierceness of the
enemy's fire brought the movement to a halt, the enemy assaying
to charge, and failing. The position was obstinately held for a
short time to permit relief by Ransom's approach, when General
Hagood, standing behind the Seventh battalion, saw the Twenty-seventh
regiment coming back, and ordered the Eleventh regiment
and Seventh battalion back behind the outer entrenchments.
It appeared afterward that the Twenty-seventh came back under
an order sent direct from General Hoke, who had found out his
mistake as to Ransom's position, and whose instructions, it will
be remembered, did not permit him to press at this point at this
time.

Hagood reformed his lines and remained inactive during the
rest of the day with the remainder of the army. The enemy, very
soon after the advance of his three regiments, withdrew from his
front. Somewhat later in the day, he was hurried to Hoke's right
to resist a supposed flanking movement, which not taking place,
he was returned to his first position. Late in the afternoon, Ransom
moved down Hoke's line to and beyond the turnpike, after
the enemy had withdrawn. The Twenty-seventh regiment was
thrown out to make the right of Ransom's line in this march.

During the whole battle, the brigade behaved with a steadiness
and gallantry that was very gratifying. It was a spectacle to
rejoice the heart of a soldier, the steadiness with which the
Seventh received the enemy's onset when its new line was taken.
Sitting down at the word of command, it gave and received at
close range for ten minutes a murderous fire, the color bearer

slowly waving his flag, and not a straggler going to the rear.
When the line moved, it is no exaggeration to say that the bodies
of the dead and wounded marked the position it had held. There
were fifty-seven bullet marks received on its flag in the action, and
in one of its companies (Brooks's) there were sixty-five casualties,
of which nineteen were killed outright. The casualties of the
whole brigade were 433; its field return of the previous day was
2,235.

Colonels Gaillard and Gantt, Lieutenant-Colonel Nelson, Major
Glover and Captain Wilds, commanding regiments, discharged
their duty with marked ability and were gallantly seconded by
their men. Major Rion and Captain Brooks, of the Seventh,
behaved with conspicuous gallantry, remaining in command after
receiving serious wounds, Rion until nightfall, and Brooks until
he was ordered to the rear by the brigade commander. The staff,
Captain Moloney, Lieutenant Mazyck and Lieutenant Martin
exhibited their usual courage and efficiency. Each one of them
had his horse killed under him in the discharge of his duties, and
Captain Moloney had a second one, which he obtained during the
day, killed.

Lieutenants Taft, Lalam, Shuler, Bomar and Elliott, and Captain
China (all of the Twenty-fifth regiment) were killed. Bomar
was killed in an heroic exposure of himself, rendered necessary by
the failure of his captain to do his duty. China, Elliott and
Shuler were all originally of the First South Carolina regiment.
General Hagood had served with them from the beginning of
the war, and valued them highly as brave and efficient officers.

The following officers and men were mentioned for gallant
conduct by regimental commanders:

Twenty-seventh Regiment—Lieutenant Gelling, Company C,
acting adjutant; Color Bearer Tupper, Private H. P. Foster of
the color guard, and First Sergeant Pickens Butler Watts of Company
E.

In Seventh Battalion—Sergeant J. H. Outz, color bearer,
killed.

* In the color guard of the Seventh Battalion, Sergeants J. B. Robinson and G. W.
Kennington were successively killed with the colors in their hands after Outz fell,
and the colors were brought out by Sergeant Preston Cooper.

In Eleventh Regiment—Lieutenant W. G. Bowman, Company
B; Color Bearer Hickman; Privates J. Jones, Company K; G. W.
Hicks, Company K; A. P. Bulger, Company D, and A. Mixson,
Company F.

In Twenty-fifth Regiment—Sergeant B. P. Izlar, Company G;
Sergeant H. P. Greer, Company B; Privates J. T. Shumaker,
Company G, W. A. Dotterer, Company A, and — Wise, Company
F.

General Hagood also reported for meritorious services, coming
under his immediate observation, Private J. K. Williams, Company
—, Twenty-seventh regiment. He was an Irishman and
deserted to the enemy at Bermuda Hundreds a few days afterward.
In the following August, after the fight on the Weldon
road, one of the brigades captured on the field was carried by a
battery which had been particularly destructive to us and recognized
in one of the gunners, Hagood's "meritorious" Irishman.
Williams greeted him cheerfully and asked after "the gineral."

President Davis was on the field during the latter part of the
day. The army bivouacked among the unburied corpses of the
enemy, and feasted that night upon the unwonted luxuries of
coffee, sardines and canned meats, with which his abandoned
camps were abundantly supplied. The brigade here obtained a
good supply of shelter tents (the tent d'abies of the French);
and the Eleventh regiment, as heretofore mentioned, supplied
itself with Enfield rifles, throwing its old smooth-bore muskets
upon the ground to be picked up by the ordnance fatigue parties.