16. Instance in demonstrations about man, which can only be verbal.
For instance: let man be that concerning
which you would by these first principles demonstrate anything, and we shall see, that so far as demonstration is
by these principles, it is only verbal, and gives us no certain, universal, true proposition, or knowledge, of any
being existing without us. First, a child having framed the idea of a man, it is probable that his idea is just like that
picture which the painter makes of the visible appearances joined together; and such a complication of ideas
together in his understanding makes up the single complex idea which he calls man, whereof white or flesh-colour
in England being one, the child can demonstrate to you that a negro is not a man, because white colour was one of
the constant simple ideas of the complex idea he calls man; and therefore he can demonstrate, by the principle, It
is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, that a negro is not a man; the foundation of his certainty being
not that universal proposition, which perhaps he never heard nor thought of, but the clear, distinct perception he
hath of his own simple ideas of black and white, which he cannot be persuaded to take, nor can ever mistake one
for another, whether he knows that maxim or no. And to this child, or any one who hath such an idea, which he
calls man, can you never demonstrate that a man hath a soul, because his idea of man includes no such notion or
idea in it. And therefore, to him, the principle of What is, is, proves not this matter; but it depends upon collection
and observation, by which he is to make his complex idea called man.
