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Kolodziej Sees Limited Accord

such activities. But the
enforcement means are so
and o much depends
on the good will and consent
of North Vietnam, the Viet
Cong and the Saigon regime
that little can be expected to
stop the continued play of
violence, subversion, and
agitation, characteristic of
revolutionary warfare, in the
politics of South Vietnam. The
signs of political coercion are
manifest enough. The accord
makes no settlement of the
fate of political prisoners held
by both sides, numbering in
the thousands. It will not be
surprising if their ranks
increase, not decrease. There is
the presence, too, of 145,000
North Vietnamese troops in
South Vietnam. Both the Viet
Cong and the Thiu
government retain intact, as
the case may be, their large
military, militia, and police
forces. Laos and Cambodia can
still be used for staging small
and easily concealed guerrilla
actions. The political
mobilization of the South
Vietnamese people will go on
in an atmosphere charged with
a host of local, village battles
where, if past is prologue,
intimidation, coercion, and
even assassination of local
leaders will be companions of
the daily struggle for survival.

'Incentives At Work'

In the short-run, there are
incentives at work to keep the
conflict at a sub-conventional
level heightened by efforts by
all parties to mobilize and
control the South Vietnamese
population. From the
perspective of Communist
elements, the cease-fire gets
American troops out of
Vietnam, why risk their
re-entry by enlarging the war
again, or doing so
precipitously? The
forth-coming international
convention, if it is convened,
could contribute further to
discouraging the re-expansion
of the war. The Big Powers will
legitimatize the terms of the
regional accord and the limits
within which the struggle may
continue. The Soviet Union
and China will be openly held
to respect the accord by
limiting their military aid to
Hanol and the Viet Cog
Progress on detente with the
United States is hostage to that
respect China, too might well
prefer a divided Vietnam to a
unified one under Soviet
influence.

Doubtful Future

The long-run future of the
military-political process
created by the Paris accord is
more doubtful. The war may
re-escalate, gradually at first,
then with accelerating
intensity. There is the
possibility, too, that the
conflict will continue
indefinitely at a lower level of
military engagement, with one
of two possible consequences.
Either one side will gain the
upper hand or the conflict will
be protracted. Official
Washington gives the Saigon
regime a "decent chance," as
we are told, to prevail in the
latter circumstance. There is
little likelihood that Saigon
will defeat the Viet Cong. In
any event, President Nixon will
be able to claim to have
achieved peace with honor for
the United States in this first
real test of the Nixon Doctrine
in action.

The Saigon regime may be
less sanguine about its future
and its honor. A protracted
conflict in which all parties
survive, each with population
and territory under its effective
control, would be tantamount
to the second partition of
Vietnam, now into three parts,
and under the respective
domination of North Vietnam,
the Viet Cong and the Saigon
government.

Etially Vietnamese

Little can be said with
assurance about the peace
prospects of the cease fire.
What seems certain, and
perhaps a source of some
consolation for those pleased
with even a piece of peace, is
that, with the withdrawal of
American troops and the
return of the POW's, the
Vietnam War will once again
become essentially Vietnamese.