University of Virginia Library

Cold War Logic: Not A Dry Eye In The Bunch

By JOHN ISRAEL

As commentators have
noted, the national reaction to
the Vietnam settlement is far
from euphoric. It is, rather, a
mood of relief coupled with
profound exhaustion. After
eight years in the anti-war
movement, however, I cannot
join in even this restrained
celebration My reasons:

1. The post-Geneva
conditions that led to the
Second Indochina War
(1954-73) now exist once
again:

a) The postponement of
reunification, which is the only
way to satisfy the legitimate
national aspirations of the
Vietnamese people, create a
politically and economically
viable state, and remove
Vietnam from great power
domination.

b) The failure of this peace
settlement, like that of its
1954 precursor, to provide
adequate mechanisms for
transferring conflict from the
military to the political arena.

c) The existence of a Saigon
dictatorship that can remain in
power only by refusing to
allow such a political process
to develop.

d) The assumption of the
Nixon administration, like that
of all other administrations
since Truman's, that the Saigon
regime is the sole legitimate
government in South Vietnam
and that it is America's interest
to maintain it in power.

Though Thieu, like Diem, is
determined to use police and
military power to intimidate
opponents and maintain
control, unlike Diem, he has
signed an international
agreement that pledges him to
do otherwise. For example, the
peace agreement commits the
two South Vietnamese parties
to "ensure the democratic
liberties of the people,"
including "freedom of speech"
and "freedom of movement."

However, Thieu's regime has
proclaimed that anyone who so
much as "incites" return to an
area under Communist control
will be thrown into jail– to say
nothing of those who actually
try to go back to homes in
areas held by the Provisional
Revolutionary Government.
Other "crimes" are punishable
by summary execution or
imprisonment. At the same
time, Thieu has initiated a
massive propaganda campaign
accusing the Communists of
preparing to violate the
accords. Cynicism worthy of a
Goebbels!

In the 1950s, Diem's
opponents– former Viet Minh
and other— reacted to
vendettas by Diem's
American-trained police by
taking to arms. Only later did
Hanoi throw its support behind
the rebellion, a fact recognized
even by pro-war spokesmen
such as USIA's Douglas Pike.
Under similar conditions, how
are Thieu's critics to protect
themselves if not by force of
arms? And then, what is to
prevent both the United States
and North Vietnam from
renewed intervention?

Once Thieu's regime starts
to falter, like its predecessors
have since 1961, is there any
reason to believe that Nixon,
or a subsequent administration,
will hesitate to ball it out, this
time by resumption of massive
bombing?

2. Fighting in Laos and
Cambodia continues, even after
the Vietnam accord has been
signed. In fact, the bombing of
those countries may well be
escalated. Previous bombing
cut-backs in North Vietnam
have been accompanied by
intensified bombing elsewhere.
(What else to do with all those
empty planes and all that spare
ordinance?)

Nixon's oft-stated rationales
for intervention in Laos and
Cambodia– to cut the enemy's
supply lines, destroy his
sanctuaries, ensure the safe
withdrawal of our troops from
Vietnam, etc. etc.– clearly are
anachronistic. The real reason
for the continued aerial
onslaught against Laos and
Cambodia is that we have thus
far failed to create militarily
powerful dictatorships like Mr.
Thieu's to protect our putative
interests in those countries.

The only hope for our
proteges in Vientiane and
Phnom Penh is continued war.
Hence any peace agreements
for these countries may be still
less viable than the one for
Vietnam.

3. The same Cold War logic
that sucked us into Vietnam
continues to align us with
dictatorships in South Korea,
the Philippines, Thailand, and
Indonesia– to mention only
some Asian examples. Under
the Nixon doctrine we may
expect American tax dollars,
advisers, CIA and Special
Forces operatives, napalm,
cluster bombs, and other
anti-personnel weapons to be
dumped into those places
indefinitely.

4. The American political
system has not responded to
the challenge. The President
got us in the President got us
out, praised be the President.
Neither the legislative nor the
judicial branch has seen fit to
set effective limits on executive
powers to initiate and make
war. Nor does Congress seem
prepared to pass the kind of
legislation that will prevent
future Vietnams.

5. Mr. Nixon seeks to
withdraw us from the war
without abandoning the myths
that pulled us into it. His
announcement of the peace
agreement was larded with the
old rhetoric which,
unfortunately, he appears to
take very seriously. 50,000
American men, he declared,
"give their lives so that the
people of Vietnam might live
in freedom." Shades of
Woodrow Wilson at his worst!
And when he served up this
rubbish— garnished with
appropriate references to the
Deity— to members of
Congress, there was "not a dry
eye in the house"!

If Nixon really believes that
something approximating
freedom is the lot of the
Vietnamese under Thieu, he
had better start reading a daily
newspaper. For a President of a
major power to bask in such
ignorance is indeed alarming.
But more alarming than his
illusions is his propensity to act
upon them. If he is convinced
that 50,000 Americans died to
bring freedom to South
Vietnam, what will keep him
from sending in a few more to
redeem their sacrifice. The
war may be ending, but the
machinery of war remains: the
bloated Pentagon budgets, the
military-industrial
boondoggles, the draft (yes,
boys and girls, there is a draft;
it's just gone into hibernation
for a while), the judicial system
that punishes dissenters by
hauling them into court for
costly trials even when
conviction is unlikely, and the
same judicial system which has
turned tens of thousands of
conscience-stricken Americans
into political prisoners or
permanent exiles.

The war has left the nation
in a state of "sickness unto
death." As Nicholas von
Hoffman recently observed, it
will be a long time before
many of us can think of the
President and his associates as
anything but war criminals.
For millions, reasoned
discourse has proved
ineffectual, political action
futile. Eight and a half years
after the Tonkin Gulf incident,
a substantial majority of
Americans remain vulnerable
to the knee-jerk "patriotism"
to which all nations' leaders
appeal when they want to drag
their people into war.

The public is nearly as
ignorant about the origins and
meaning of the war now as it