University of Virginia Library

De Gaulle Foresees Permanent American Hegemony In Europe

But deGaulle argues that renunciation of Germany
and Europe requires the disengagement
of American forces. Hence at some point
Germany must "integrate" its forces under
French leadership.

Thirdly, de Gaulle holds that a true United
States of Europe - a supranational entity - is
an illusion which ignores history and culture
and which operationally would become an
institutional means of preserving American hegemony
in Western Europe. This, as noted, is
held to be especially so if the United Kingdom
is considered part of the aggregation. Moreover
it is held that a tight Western European entity,
far from acting as a focus for the east, would
instead solidify the division of Europe -
especially in view of the anticipated American
dominance directly and indirectly within that
unit. Hence while a common market may be
useful as a tool in forging a European as distinct
from an Atlantic perspective and as an important
economic base of National power, it must
not be seen as an approach to political union.
Ironically, moreover, under the terms of the
Treaties of Rome establishing the European
Communities and France's skillful exploitation
of them, the Common Market limits France's
partners more than it limits France. As long as
Germany fears diplomatic isolation on the
continent, as long as France's partners tend to
place an absolute value on the common market,
and as long as Paris has sufficient political will
to treat the Common Market in a cavalier
manner whatever its economic benefits for
France - so long then will France be able to
play a far more effective political poker game
than its partners.

Mobilizing Forces

Lastly, by renewing France's ties with the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and loosening
its ties with the United States, Paris feels that it
can mobilize the forces of detente in Europe
east and west. Furthermore, De Gaulle is a
"political dramatist" who feels that the
example of a dynamic, self-confident, independent
France will galvanize national forces in
Eastern Europe and elsewhere sufficient to
emasculate the ideological imperialism of the
two superpowers. Romanian nationalism, however
fragile, and Czechoslovak national self-assertion,
if temporarily aborted, are seen as
reenactments of the French example and
symbols of the future.

Germany - politically divided, militarily
exposed, and morally suspect - could not help
but define its policy differently than that of
France. The immediate goals of Germany, as
Chancellor Adenauer saw them in 1949, were
to reestablish the international sovereignty of
an economically-recovered Germany and to
secure German security. Political integration in
a Western European grouping seemed to offer
the best instrument for political-economic recovery.
To organically tie Bonn to a European
Union at the same time that Germany recovered
its internal independence would lessen the
suspicions and fears of its neighbors and give
Germany - cut off from the east - a European
vocation. The basis for such a union had of
necessity to be Franco-German amity.

Security Requirements

On the other hand, German security required
a certain American guarantee and commitment.
At the same time, moreover, American
desires for a strong conventional force in
Europe to meet a feared Soviet invasion meant
that Germany could trade off its participation
in such a force for the restoration of its
sovereignty - albeit placed under the organic
wraps of integration.

Adenauer believed that a strong united
Europe backed by a nuclear-armed United
States would in time create a position of
strength which would act as a focus of attraction
to the cast and put irrepressible pressures
on Soviet Russia to disengage from Eastern
Europe. In all this, Adenauer's thought paralleled
the French integrationists. Unlike many of
them, however, he envisioned that the united
Europe would be incorporated within a larger
Atlantic framework on a more or less permanent
basis. The demands of security were such
that the Bonn government could not easily
contemplate an American disengagement from
Western Europe. Indeed, with the advent of
nuclear stalemate, and unlike the Gaullists,
Germany seemed even more intent on reaffirming
the American commitment to Europe. Out
off from nuclear weapons itself and not overly
impressed with the vision of a French force,
Germany still saw no alternative but close ties
with the United States. At the same time, of
course, the construction of Europe and a
diplomatic role for Germany seemed to depend
on close Franco-German ties. One of the
tragedies of Germany is that the American and
the French have attempted to push Germany
into accepting only one of them.

German Commitment

De Gaulle saw the Franco-German agreement
of 1963 as a commitment by Germany to
collaborate with France as a matter of priority
in political, strategic, and weapons policy. The
United States, hostile to De Gaulle and suspicious
of his brand of European cooperation,
put increased pressures on Germany to buy
American military hardware and held out the
prospect of giving Germany greater influence in
NATO policy and strategy, especially nuclear.
Germany drawn in both directions found itself
frustrated and dissatisfied.

The result was two major trends of thought
in Germany - that of Erhard who put greatest
emphasis on an Anglo-American link and that
of Strauss (joined in time by Adenauer now out
of office) who called for the construction of an
independent Europe armed with nuclear weapons.
The Strauss group, like the Gaullists,
doubted the strength of America's commitment
and called for an European Europe. Unlike the
Gaullists, the Strauss group accepted integration
which it was felt would give Germany
greater political leverage than simple contractual
relations with France. Both the Strauss and
Erhard groups, however, maintained the Adenauer
concept of a position of strength. They
saw not merely a thaw in the cast but a
reunification of Germany and the continent
which would be tantamount to the
disintegration of the Soviet empire. They both
held to the philosophy of the Hallstein doctrine
- a doctrine which aimed at isolating East
Germany in the interest of destroying its
political viability. Under the doctrine, Bonn
refused to conduct formal diplomatic relations
with those states, aside from the USSR, which
recognized East Germany. This policy, in effect,
cut Bonn off from intimate relations with
the states of Eastern Europe as well. In any
case, a position of strength in the west and
isolation of the east was the formula by which
Germany was to be reunited.

By the mid-1960's, however, it was reasonably
clear to the Germans that the policy of
strength and isolation had not in fact brought
German or continental unity any closer. Like
past governments, Kissinger still believes that
German policy must be based on two pillars -
German-American intimacy to protect its exposed
position and Franco-German friendship
to prevent diplomatic isolation on the continent.
The Straussian integration scheme,
which still has strong support, is held in
abeyance by De Gaulle's policy on such a
union. Beyond these positions, however, the
Kissinger government has adopted a new policy
of actively courting the eastern states. In line
with both French and American thought, the
Germans came to believe that the unification of
Germany ultimately depended on cordial relations
with the Eastern European states. At the
same time, Germany has sought increased contacts
with Pankew - although still somewhat
intent on isolating that regime, a fact which
could be accomplished in many respects by
drawing the other Eastern European states into
closer economic and diplomatic relation with
Bonn. One in fact should not underestimate the
enormous economic and political attraction
West Germany has for Eastern Europe. If West
German relations with the East could unfold in
such a way as to dampen their fears of a
revanchist Germany, the whole unity of the
Warsaw Pact could be seriously undermined.
And, indeed, the invasion of Czechoslovakia
by Soviet troops may be testimony to the
success of Germany's efforts. Nevertheless, in
view of the Soviet invasion, it cannot be said
that a policy of unification through detente has
ultimately proved any more successful than a
policy of unification through a hard line toward
the East.

Superpowers in Europe

Thus I return to point with which I began:
the fate of Europe rests today as in 1948 in the
hands of the Superpowers. Whether Germany
followed Adenauer's policy of "positions of
strength" or Kissinger's policy of "detente,"
Soviet policy was finally decisive. Whether
France followed the Atlantic policy of the
Fourth Republic or the "national-European"
policy of General De Gaulle, it was Soviet
Russia which defined the limits of detente.

On the other side of the coin, the United
States has engaged itself enough in Europe to
prevent the logic of the Franco-German agreement
from being fulfilled - on the belief, I
suspect, that a "European Europe" is less in the
American national interest than an "Atlantic
Europe." Dealing bilaterally with the European
states, the United States is clearly dominant. If
it must deal multilaterally with those states, it
must be so constructed as to preserve America's
key role. In a perverse sense, Russia and the
United States have a common interest in
Europe. Each wishes a Europe united under its
auspices. That being impossible, both will accept
a divided Europe - and Germany - under
the dual hegemonies. Neither can contemplate
with equanimity a Europe - united or divided
- outside of their control.

Change Sensitivity

On the other hand, sensitive to charges of
hegemonic politics, this country has in recent
years called upon Western Europe to take the
initiative - thus ignoring the fragility of the
Western European consensus. In this sense, the
United States is too little engaged. The difference
of perspectives is such in Western
Europe that whatever unity of policy is to be
achieved will come through American leadership
- a leadership, however, which must be
sensitive to the differing perspectives and aspirations
of the various groups. And a key element
of this leadership must be a dynamic policy
which offers some hope for the union of
Europe. However committed the Soviet Union
is to its position in Eastern Europe and however
fruitless our gestures may be, this country must
fish in Eastern Europe's troubled waters as the
Soviet Union fishes in Western Europe's troubled
waters. It must be clear to the Europeans
- and the Germans in the first instance - that
the bonus for Europe's division lies with Soviet
Russia. An attitude which indicates satisfaction
with the division of Europe or smacks too
clearly of a policy of spheres of influence (i.e.,
"Whatever you do in Czechoslovakia or East
Germany is regrettable but your business.") will
alienate in time the Germans and make even
more cogent De Gaulle's arguments about the
dual hegemonies. And, indeed, a "European
Europe" may emerge - in a form by no means
compatible with America's interest in a "stable
competition" with the Soviet Union.

Specifically, it can be argued that American
policy toward Czechoslovakia this year has
been less than imaginative. A demand from the
United States of a non-intervention pledge from
the Russians, a clear mobilization of diplomatic
pressures, and perhaps even the allowance of
maneuvers on the German-Czechoslovak border
not by specifically German but by NATO
forces - all of these would have communicated
a dynamism and concern which seemed curiously
lacking. In the words of George Liska,
"Instead of taking calculated risks on a psychological
intercession, the United States gambled
recklessly on the slender chance that the
Czechoslovaks would escape the rigors of military
intervention." (Inter Play, October 1968)

Of course, the basis of our policy was the
belief that too close an alignment with the
Czech cause would have certainly precipitated
Soviet intervention and given substance to
Soviet charges that the events in Czechoslovakia
were being directed by external forces. The
critical fact to recall, however, is the strategically
important position of Czechoslovakia.
Russia had to weight alternatives and set priorities.
The "defection" of Czechoslovakia -
albeit informal - would clearly have called into
question the stability of Russia's entire East
European empire. Only a military invasion
could halt the liberalizing events in Eastern
Europe. On the other hand, Russia had to
calculate what impact such a move might have
on Soviet policy elsewhere. Given the alternatives,
it seems likely in any event that Russia
would have chosen the bird in the hand over
the two in the bushes. If the Czech virus should
spread, it could be seen as nothing but disastrous.
However that may be, it was not necessary
that, while the Soviets were engaged in
weighing the pluses and minuses, our Government
through its actions in effect "assured" the
Russians that Czechoslovakia was indeed in
their sphere of influence and our hands were
tied. Many Western Europeans were inevitably
bound to see our role as one of "objective
collusion" with the Soviet Union in the perpetuation
of a divided Europe.

The realities of 1968 are those of 1948 -
the division of Europe and bipolarity, however
"muted." Whatever the responses and policies
of the various European governments, the
resolution or stalemate of the "European question"
still largely depends on the perceptions,
policies, and creativity of the Superpowers.
And for the American government it must be
clear that American leadership cannot depend
on a simple definition of spheres of influence.
It still rests as in 1948 not only on a vision and
policy for Western Europe but on a conception
and policy toward united Europe.