University of Virginia Library

Vietnam, Foreign Policy

Q: If the President is secretly harboring a desire
to obtain a military victory, how realistic a goal
is that?

A: Victory rests on the perfect success of
Vietnamization. To achieve such a goal requires
a highly effective South Vietnamese army. The
Laotian experience suggests that the South
Vietnamese army is not completely effective.
Actually Vietnamization has not been defined
very precisely. It appears at times that the gap
in efficiency between American and South
Vietnamese forces is to be filled by the introduction
of greater firepower from the air. Some
officials have gone on record as anticipating the
time when the firepower of gunships will be so
heavy that United States aircraft can dispose of
a jungle enemy without the use of ground
forces at all. I do not believe that the President
has promised the withdrawal of all United
States forces from Vietnam by the end of 1972.
He seems to be suggesting something more akin
to a Korean settlement, with a commitment of
a small, but effective, contingent of American
military forces over a long period of time. It is
well to recall that the Nixon Doctrine, which
emphasizes the need to cut down the American
presence in Asia, in no way redefines the
dangers which the United States allegedly faces
in that region of the globe.

Q: If you were asked to write a history of the
United States involvement in Southeast Asia.,
how would you approach the problem?

A: The books on Southeast Asia tend to be
quite repetitive. The book I have in mind would
combine a study of United States-Australian
relations with a study of the Vietnam War. I
hesitate to write about Australian foreign

policy despite the quantity of material I have
gathered on that subject. Somehow I feel that
could not do it as well as might the Australians
themselves. But a book that deals with United
States policy as well as Australian policy
toward the Vietnam issue would give me some
advantage. I know the American side very well
— perhaps better than the Australians. And a
study of this nature would permit me to
examine the meaning of an alliance between a
major and a minor power. I could ask some
significant questions regarding the Australian
character. So for me a book combining the
United States, Australia, and Vietnam might be
a worthwhile endeavor.

Q: Some people have called Vietnam a mistake.
They feel that the goals we set out to
accomplish could never be accomplished in the
first place.

A: They could have been accomplished, I
believe, had we been able to define them. The
American people cannot agree on what they are
trying to accomplish. This nation has the power
to do what needs to be done in Southeast Asia.
But what needs to be done? Those who detect
in Vietnam a serious threat to American
prestige and security, do not seem to be
concerned at the past and present price which
the United States has paid to keep the Saigon
regime in power. But those Americans who
regard the struggle for South Vietnam largely a
limited, internal matter, and certainly no threat
to the United States, have begun to question
every aspect of the war, especially the
widespread killing of Vietnamese civilians.
Many leading proponents of the war have
insisted that the United States made a mistake
when it became involved in Vietnam militarily.
But many add that once we went in we had no
choice but th stay and win. I find little logic in
this. A mistake is a mistake. Perhaps it might be
wiser to tie policy to the assumption that there
has been a mistake. The idea is an old one that
the world looks to the United States to uphold
the entire structure of international politics,
that if we falter no nation will again trust the
American word and the whole system of world
order will collapse. It is this self-assigned role of
world leader that makes it very difficult for any
Washington administration to alter an
established American policy.

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