University of Virginia Library

Eisenberg On Democrats

State Machine Seen Decaying

A coalition of liberal, moderate
and conservative elements of
Virginia's dominant Democratic
Party was a key to the party's
success in the presidential election
in 1964 and the gubernatorial
election the following year.

But this era of good feeling was
short lived. Democratic party strife,
the prospects of a vigorous Republican
challenge for the Governor's
Mansion next November, and the
possibility that the Democrats may
lose their urban support are taken
into consideration by a University
political scientist who reviews and
identifies the components of past
Democratic success.

Ralph Eisenberg, associate professor
of government and foreign
affairs and assistant director of the
University's Institute of Government,
analyzes the brief era of good
feeling that ended in 1966 and
factors that could lead to a
Republican victory 1 November.

His article, "Gubernatorial Politics
in Virginia; The Experience of
1965," appears in the Institute's
current News Letter. He shows that
coalition politics, reflecting the
increasingly urban nature of the
State's dominant party, led to the
victories in 1964 and 1965. This
was done without the party's
traditional dependence on conservative
rural areas of the State.

In the unique 1965 campaign,
Democratic gubernatorial candidate
Mills E. Godwin Jr., was supported
by a successful coalition bringing
together all factions of the party.
This wide spectrum of support had
been forged the previous year and
had worked behind Lyndon
Johnson's successful candidacy in
the State, writes Mr. Eisenberg.

A unified party, unscarred by a
tough primary battle, was helped to
victory by the Negro vote, which
had been alienated from their
traditional Republican position by
the candidacy of Barry Goldwater
and the increasingly urban development
of the State, he notes.

In part this proved successful
because Mr. Godwin indicated to
the voters that his approach to the
office would be less conservative
than his predecessors. Thus he
attracted the more moderate and
liberal elements of the party to his
banner. This, together with Godwin's
successful attempt to gain the
Negro vote, antagonized more conservative
elements of the party,
who began their own Virginia
Conservative Party, Mr. Eisenberg
writes.

Mr. Eisenberg believes that the
Negro vote was "of particular
importance to the Democratic victory."
In past years the vote had
been counted on as a "source of
Republican strength." In 1965,
however, at least three-fourths of
the Negro vote went to Godwin,
Mr. Eisenberg reports.

With an "attractive candidate"
in Linwood Holton and a call for
"more liberal State programs,"
based on a criticism of the Democratic
Party's failure to meet State
problems, the Republicans made an
impressive showing in 1965, Mr.
Eisenberg believes.

The successful and extremely
broad Democratic coalition presented
the Republicans with an
"impossible task," he writes. In
Northern Virginia, the Republican
plurality was reduced by moderate
and liberal endorsements of Mr.
Godwin.

Mr. Eisenberg believes that the
presence of the Virginia Conservative
Party was not decisive. The
effectiveness of the State's dominant
organization and the ties of
party loyalty offset the Conservative's
strength in Southside
Virginia.

The writer believes the Republicans
can bring two-party politics to
Virginia in State-wide contests (in
national elections Virginia is already
a two-party state), only if
they can continue to attract urban
voters. With a leadership that is
"increasingly diverse and divided,"
the Democrats cannot "run the risk
of alienating the urban voter," Mr.
Eisenberg writes.