University of Virginia Library

Russia Violates Own Resolution In Czech Invasion

By Robert S. Wood

Mr. Wood is a professor in the College's
Department of Government and Foreign Affairs
and is currently in his second year of teaching
here. Prior to coming to the University, he
taught at Bentley College for two years, from
1965 to 1967. In September of this year, he
obtained his Ph.D. in international relations
from Harvard University.

The Juridical Dictionary (Yuridichesky
Slovar, Gospolitizdat, Moscow 1956), one of
the Soviet Union's most authoritative reference
works, defines international law in traditional
terms of non-intervention and asserts the applicability
of such norms to relations between
socialist states: International law recognizes the
right of every nation to settle its affairs as it
pleases . . . International law prohibits the interference
of any state in the internal affairs of
others, proclaiming intervention, especially
armed, an international crime . . . Relations between
[socialist states] are based on full and
effective equality of all nations, big as well as
small ones, on the maintenance of all sovereign
rights and the independence of every state, on
non-interference in the internal affairs of
another state, on mutual respect for national
interests . . .

During the twentieth session of the United
Nations General Assembly, the Soviet representative
to that body introduced a "Draft Declaration
on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in
the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection
of Their Independence and Sovereignty."
That resolution condemned "armed or any
other type of intervention" and called upon
"all States to be guided in their international
relations by the principle of mutual respect and
of non-intervention in domestic affairs for any
reason, whether economic, political or ideological."

Spiked Boot and Iron Fist

In August the role of defender of the
precepts of international norms gave way to the
spiked boot and the iron first. The strategic and
political interests of the Soviet ruling group(s)
demanded the crushing of the Czechoslovak
attempts at democratization and at broader
"extra-bloc" ties. Pravda specified the limits of
"abstract" norms of international law and Mr.
Gremyke reiterated those constraints in the
General Assembly: The law and legal norms are
subordinated to the laws of class struggle, to
the laws of social development . . . The peoples
of the socialist countries, the communist parties,
undoubtedly have - and must have - the
freedom to determine the road of development
of their country. However, any decision they
adopt must not inflict damage either to socialist
in their country, or to the basic interests of
other socialist countries, to the entire world
workers' movement which is waging a struggle
for socialism, (Pravda, 16 September, 1968).

In effect the interests of the so-called
"socialist commonwealth" imposed distinct
limits to a universal international law and to
Pan-European ties. As the Czech coup of 1948
signalled the political and ideological bifurcation
of Europe, so the Czech invasion of 1968
testified to the limits of detente.

Rise of the Hegemonies

And in important ways the fundamental
international political facts of 1948 were also
those of 1968, that is, the political collapse of
Europe and the rise of the two hegemonies. If
Russia and the United States no longer loom
over a ravaged and divided Europe, Europe is
divided all the same. However "muted" or
"cooperative" bipolarity may be, Europe is still
dominated by it. However much political influence
and economic power the states of
Europe may have achieved, a resolution to what
de Gaulle labels the "scandal of Yalta" lies in
1968 as in 1948 in the hands of Soviet Russia
and the United States.

Europe's most articulate spokesman hence
defines in similar terms in 1968 as he did in
1948 the misfortune of Europe, of which
Czechoslovakia is one of the most potent
symbols. In his press conference of Sept. 9,
President de Gaulle commented: "The division
into blocs . . . that was imposed on Europe
while it was torn is a misfortune from which
follows either misfortunes. Indeed, that division
constitutes, for the peoples of our continent, a
permanent encroachment on their right to
independence, at a time when each one of them
is capable, par excellence, of conducting its
own affairs. Moreover, to distribute the nation
of Europe into two camps, dominated by two
rivals, is to prevent them from normally establishing
between them the economic, cultural
and human relations that are consistent with
their nature and tendencies of a thousand years,
while in our times, when everything depends on
modern development, it is detente, entente and
cooperation that their mutual interests requires.

Political and Military Tension

Finally, the political and military tension maintained
between them constantly puts peace in
question. There is no ideology that can justify
such an artificial and dangerous situation."

Since World War Two, therefore, Europe,
and especially France and Germany, have had
to address their policies, domestic and international,
to the "realities" of a divided Europe
and a bipolar world. They have not responded
to these political facts, however, from identical
perspectives and in similar terms. Whereas the
conscious imperialism of Soviet Russia in the
East imposed a similar political assessment and
a similar European policy on those states,
American dominance in the West, which was
situational rather than deliberate, left a great
margin of autonomy to the Western European
states in defining their position in Europe and
their relation to the dual hegemonies.

It is no surprise, therefore, that endowed
with marginal autonomy, the different national
situations of France and Germany gave rise
to different perspectives, different priorities,
and different policies. Indeed, the irony of the
post-World War Two world is that the very
pressures generated by the political collapse of
Europe and the rise of the two superpowers at
once pushed France and Germany into cooperation
and defined the limits of that cooperation.
For France and Germany had to define simultaneously
their relationship to each other and
to the two superpowers. The degree to which
they defined their relations to the two
superpowers in different terms, to that extent
their definition of France-German cooperation
would differ.

Shattered and Divided

At the conclusion of World War II, Germany
was physically shattered and divided, morally
isolated, and utterly dependent. Not only had
German nationalism been weakened, it seemed
as if its backbone and had been broken. If
however Germany was an "indubitable loser,"
France was a "dubious winner." The political
divisions of the 1930's, the rapid military
collapse of the French armies, liberation by an
extra-European powers left France humiliated
and unwilling to exalt the nation as the
ultimate value. Despite these humiliations, however,
French national consciousness emerged
from the war strengthened. Common misfortunes
had restored and strengthened the French
people's consciousness of a common identity.
Moreover, the existence of its colonies left the
French, unlike the Germans, on the stage of
world politics and gave it an extended field for
the reconstruction of its pride. National renovation
and what it conceived as the extension of
French culture and civilization in the third
world gave the French a sense of national
mission. Though temporarily humiliated and
shattered, France was seen by its leaders as still
a charter member of that exclusive club, the
great powers - a fact which is felt was
institutionalized by its status as a permanent
member of the UN security Council and the
4-power Council of Ministers. Like the United
Kingdom, and unlike Germany. France conceived
itself as a world power. Unlike the
United Kingdom, and like Germany, however,
defeat and liberation convinced the French that
the national strength must be based on forms of
European cooperation more intimate than heretofore
conceived. Last of all, France had within
its midst a nationalist per excellence, the man
who had striven to make the liberation French
as well as Anglo-American and who had given
what unity there was to the resistance movement
- General Charles de Gaulle.

Given these differences in national
situations and perspectives, it seems clear that
France and Germany could, and indeed, did
define their position toward the problems of
Europe and the existence of the two superpowers
in significantly different terms. In
simple form, The existence of a divided Europe
and a bipolar world gave rise to three questions:
How shall Europe be secured? How shall
Europe be restored economically and politically
in its individual parts? How shall Europe be
united?

Restoring France

However divided groups in France have been
on the essential requisites for a restored France
in a united Europe, there has been broad
agreement that France's normal status was one
of a great and world power, that the division of
Europe was abnormal, and that ideological and
political bipolarity was the root impediment to
the restoration of France's status and Europe's
integrity. Some Frenchmen saw an organically
integrated Western Europe united in political
will, economic strength, and military strategy -
as the basis of a reunified continent. For it was
felt that only a new political entity could at
one and at the same time provide sufficient
security to allow a disengagement of the United
States from West Europe and sufficient independence
to dampen Soviet fears that the new
construction would simply be an instrument of
Washington. Moreover, this new, dynamic, independent
construction would, it was felt, act
as a irresistible magnet to the states of Eastern
Europe. With American troops withdrawn from
Western Europe and with Germany constrained
within the organic ties of a broader European
political entity, it was felt that the Soviet
Union could no longer exploit the fears of
many eastern states of a resurgent Germany or
justify a tightly controlled Warsaw pact as a
counterbalance to a tightly American-led North
Atlantic Organization. Under these conditions,
resurgent nationalism in Eastern Europe would
render the cost of the Soviet empire too high -
forcing it to loosen its grip and to allow closer
interrelationships between east and west.

Visionary Goals

While the Gaullists shared the goals of this
vision, they denounced its integrative features.
Far from restoring France, it was held that such
schemes would submerge it in an entity over
which it may have no certain control. Moreover,
if the United Kingdom were included in
united Europe, a major purpose of the construction
would be defeated that is, the
disengagement of American forces and influence.
For Britain was seen as Atlantic rather
than European in its orientation and willing to
play the role of Trojan horse for American
power. Integration, it was claimed, would therefore
destroy France's identity, reinforce America's
influence in Europe, and lead the Soviet
Union to tighten its grip in Eastern Europe.

No, the goals of the French integrationists
could only be attained, argued General de Gaulle
in 3 ways: (1) by preserving and
strengthening all the resources of French diplomacy
and strategy, (2) by establishing contractual
ties with the German Federal Republic,
and (3) by stimulating national economic
growth through a carefully defined economic
common market which would reduce competition
from without Europe, provide a large
market for French agriculture, and stimulate
without endangering French industrial growth.

National Nuclear Force

In the first instance, this policy required a
national nuclear force. General deGaulle has
argued that with the advent of a nuclear
statement between the Soviet Union and the
United States, an American nuclear guarantee
to Europe is not entirely credible. Would, it is
asked, Washington or Moscow risk national
suicide to preserve Europe. And the answer
given is not necessarily. Indeed, American talk
of a graduated response to Soviet provocation is
seen as indicative of Washington's reluctance to
extend an unqualified nuclear guarantee to
Europe. For graduated response implied if the
French die that conventional forces would
carry the brunt of a Soviet invasion. Moreover,
American insistence that the efficiency of the
alliance requires a specialization of effort -
that is that Europe provide the conventional
and the U.S. provide the nuclear forces - raises
the spectre of Washington, paralyzed by nuclear
stalemate, fighting the Soviet forces down to
the last European. Hence the necessity that
Europe - read France - be equipped with its
own nuclear force which, however small or
marginal, is held to be more credible than an
American nuclear guarantee. Only when survival
itself is at stake would the threat to employ
such weapons against a superpower be fully
credible. (This of course raises the question as
to whether a French nuclear guarantee to
Germany is any more credible than an American
guarantee to Europe.) And last of all,
deGaulle sees the possession of nuclear weapons
as the essential ticket for membership into the
great power club.

Secondly, France believes that Germany
must align its political will with that of France.
Ultimately this requires that Bonn choose
between Paris and Washington - and in a
subsidiary sense between Paris and London. A
divided Germany under obligation not to acquire
nuclear weapons and missile delivery
systems and still feared by many states east and
west cannot, it is argued, pursue an independent
foreign policy. Bonn has to a large degree
accepted this fact but drawn the conclusion
that it must act within the context of both
close German-American and Frano-German ties.